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A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan
RICHARD G. CATOIRE

From Parameters, Winter 2000-01, pp. 102-17.

In 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognizing the importance of the unity of military effort achieved by US forces
during World War II, issued the "Outline Command Plan." This was the first in a series of documents specifying an
arrangement now known as the Unified Command Plan. The plan divided the world into geographic regions and
assigned responsibility to a designated military command for protecting US security interests in each region. This
organizing principle has guided post-World War II US military operations.[1]
Over the last 54 years, the Unified Command Plan has been revised 18 times in response to the changing strategic
environment, advances in technology, and the growing global commitment of US forces.[2] Legislation adopted in
1979 specified that the Unified Command Plan be reviewed biennially.[3] The President approved the current Unified
Command Plan on 13 October 1999.
In this latest review there were no regional or functional changes pertaining to the continent of Africa. In fact, none of
the language in the last two assessments directly addressed Africa. This is consistent with Department of Defense
declarations that the United States has "very little traditional strategic interest in Africa,"[4] but that assertion is itself
somewhat puzzling in light of the fact that the United States has intervened militarily in the region more than 20 times
since 1990.[5]
Under the current Unified Command Plan, responsibility for the continent of Africa is divided among three of the five
regional unified commands. The duties of the commands include developing joint operation plans to deter war and, if
necessary, to guide the transition to war or to military operations other than war.[6] When hostilities start, the unified
commands plan and conduct campaigns and major operations.[7]
In addition to these purely military roles, the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of the unified commands also have come
to play important diplomatic roles by using US military resources to enhance access and influence while
communicating regularly with senior foreign civil and military leaders on a variety of issues.[8] No other organization
of the US government is manned or equipped to play a regional role of this magnitude.[9]
Essentially, a unified command is the primary organization charged with protecting America's security interests in a
geographic region of the world. It does this not only by managing US military resources in the region, but by building
better security relations with the foreign countries in the region, endeavoring to build trust and "habits of cooperation"
that permit quick agreement and common action to resolve regional conflict. Assisting America's diplomats in building
coalitions and maintaining alliances is thus a key role of the unified commands. Such a role is particularly important in
regions where US resources are limited.
Because of the increased US engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa, and because the current regional unified commands
are principally focused elsewhere, the time has come to rethink the Unified Command Plan as it regards Africa. The
current plan cannot effectively protect America's security interests on that continent. It is unlikely to realize the
articulated policy objectives of the United States in the region, and it should be revised to better secure those
objectives.
History of the Unified Command Plan and Africa
The "Outline Command Plan" of 1946 established seven unified commands: Far East Command, Pacific Command,
Alaskan Command, Northeast Command, Atlantic Fleet, Caribbean Command, and European Command.[10] None
was assigned responsibility for the continent of Africa. Not until 1952 was responsibility for at least a part of Africa

assigned to a unified combatant command.[11] On 2 December 1952, recognizing the historical ties between North
Africa and Europe, the European Command was given responsibility for the Algerian Departments of France, along
with joint planning requirements for French Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya.
In 1960 the threat of a communist takeover of the newly independent Congo garnered attention to the whole of Africa.
Atlantic Command was then given responsibility for plans and operations pertaining to Sub-Saharan Africa, while
European Command retained responsibility for North Africa. In reaction to further problems in the Congo in 1962, the
Unified Command Plan was again revised, with the recently established Strike Command (USSTRICOM) given
responsibility for Sub-Saharan Africa.
When Strike Command was disestablished in 1971, responsibility for Sub-Saharan Africa was left unassigned. And so
it remained for the next 11 years. Not until the 1982 biennial review of the Unified Command Plan (as newly mandated
by Title 10 of the US Code) was the matter of responsibility for Sub-Saharan Africa again officially addressed.[12]
In the early 1980s, US strategic planners began acknowledging the importance of Africa's position astride principal sea
lines of communication and admitted concern about access to strategic minerals in the central and southern regions of
the continent. US strategic planners were also concerned over growing Cuban and Soviet involvement in the region, a
characteristic feature of US foreign policy during the Reagan presidency.
As a signal to both allies and adversaries of the increasing importance of Sub-Saharan Africa to the United States, all
countries in Africa south of the Sahara were added to the Unified Command Plan of 3 October 1983. This plan,
recognizing the long-standing links between certain NATO countries and their former colonies, assigned all states
above and below the Sahara, except those bordering the Red Sea, to the European Command. Seven countries in the
northeast corner of the continent--Sudan, Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and eventually Eritrea--were
subsequently assigned to Central Command. Responsibility for the island nations in the waters surrounding Africa
remained with either the Atlantic or Pacific commands. Notwithstanding the major geopolitical changes occurring in
the world and Africa since the end of the Cold War, this assignment of responsibilities for the African continent has
remained relatively unchanged since 1983.
So why, after all these years and in view of all these revisions, should Africa, and particularly Sub-Saharan Africa,
now warrant its own unified command?
The existing Unified Command Plan assigns responsibility for Africa to three different unified commands, none of
which has Africa as its primary concern. This division of responsibility and lack of focus on Africa makes it difficult
for the United States to prioritize its security interests and pursue them consistently in this region.[13] Because the
region is so diverse and complex, this division of responsibility only further complicates US strategy for Africa. The
lack of an overarching strategy and integrated programming hampers the effectiveness of virtually all security-related
US programs in Sub-Saharan Africa.[14]
But the US military is not alone in failing to optimize its regional effectiveness. The multiple US government agencies
involved in Africa have been criticized for a similar failure to coordinate their efforts to effectively secure US interests
in the region.[15] Because of the subsequent inability to shape the emerging regional security environment, it is little
wonder that the US government and the Department of Defense are regularly obliged to undertake expensive
interventions in response to crises in Africa.[16] A review of African issues reveals the necessity for a more coherent
strategy.
Africa's Fortunes and Misfortunes
The continent of Africa is the second largest and second most populous landmass in the world. The great expanse of
the Sahara Desert separates the population of Africa racially, economically, and religiously across the north and south
of the continent. The societies north of the desert have strong cultural, ethnic, and religious ties to the Arab Middle
East. Islam is the predominant religion. In most respects, North Africa is more a part of the Arab Middle East or
Mediterranean Basin than of Sub-Saharan Africa,[17] and for that reason, the interest here is the 48 countries and 700
million people of Sub-Saharan Africa.

With internal relationships differentiated by nationality, ethnicity, subregionality (central, eastern, western, and
southern sub-regions), language (Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone), sub-regional economic ties, and religion
(Christian, Muslim, traditional), the environment of Sub-Saharan Africa may be the most complex on earth.[18] SubSaharan Africa's population is diverse, comprising 3,000 indigenous ethnic groups speaking over 1,000 different local
languages. About a third of this number would be considered at least nominally Islamic. Over half claim adherence to
some form of Christianity.[19]
The region has tremendous mineral wealth, huge hydro-electrical power reserves, and significant underdeveloped
ocean resources. The better part of the world's diamonds, gold, and chromium are produced in countries at the southern
end of the continent. Some 20 percent of America's oil now is imported from Africa. Copper, bauxite, phosphate,
uranium, tin, iron ore, cobalt, and titanium are also mined in significant quantities. The waters off both coasts of the
continent support huge fisheries. The continent's potential as a market and as a source of important commodities is
great.
For all its economic potential, however, Sub-Saharan Africa is the most marginalized region of the world. Of the 20
poorest nations of the world, 18 are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. Of all the world's peoples, Africans have the least
chance to survive five years, or to live to 50. Africa has the highest infant mortality rates and highest death rates in the
world, reflecting its poor health care, sanitation, and diets. Life expectancy is the lowest in the world and forecast to
decrease dramatically due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic throughout large areas of the sub-continent: Africa accounts for
more than two-thirds of the world's HIV cases.[20] Yet Africa's annual population growth rate, exceeding three
percent, is the highest in the world, rapidly adding to already unsupportable population levels. Over 40 percent of the
population is under the age of 15. This population is stressed by health threats, including drug-resistant and lethal
strains of malaria and tuberculosis. Diseases like sleeping sickness, schistosomiasis, and river blindness--once thought
under control--have made a comeback in recent years. African countries lack the resources to cope with natural
disasters--as evidenced by the flooding in Mozambique in February and March 2000--or to provide a health and
educational infrastructure adequate to the challenges they face.
While some attribute the problems of Sub-Saharan Africa to the legacy of European colonialism, present-day
difficulties are much more complicated and deeper than that. True enough, the colonial borders separated ethnically
related peoples, undermined indigenous patterns of sustenance and trade, and left Africa fragmented into 53 different
states based on external models of political organization. But not all of Africa's problems can or should be traced to
some 70 years of European colonialism or simply to differences in race, religion, and ethnicity, or to artificial borders.
A view of the map of Africa shows it to be highly balkanized, consisting of many mini-states (37 boast populations of
10 million or less) and some 15 landlocked independent states (40 percent of the world's total).[21] Yet if African
statehood were determined solely by ethnicity, the continent could boast up to 3,000 political entities, a situation that
would exacerbate the problem of "mini-states."
Sub-Saharan Africa's legacy includes a much more intractable problem: societies divided between the descendants of
landowners and peasants, former slaves and former slave owners, as well as people who were favored by their
colonizers and people who were not.[22] Rulers of post-colonial Africa have exploited these differences to garner
personal and political support from sub-groups identified by class, caste, ethnicity, and religion.
Economic and military assistance rendered by the former Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War
somewhat mitigated and obscured these differences, relegating them to the background of world events. But the
vacuum created by the end of that conflict has allowed Africa's destabilizing diversities to come to the forefront. The
result is evident in the extraordinary human tragedies of the last decade in countries like Liberia, Somalia, Sudan,
Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Such problems will persist for generations, and the developed
world will be confronted with Africa's tragedies into the indefinite future.
The stability of Africa is not only threatened by intrastate and environmental problems. In the immediate aftermath of
independence in the early 1960s, African leaders generally agreed to respect their neighbors' sovereignty.[23] The
inviolability of colonial borders was perhaps the most fundamental principle in the charter of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), established in 1963. However, by the end of the 1990s, this principle was seriously challenged

when one secessionist state, Eritrea, attained independence, and Africans themselves began to intervene with
conventional military forces in their neighbors' civil wars.[24]
In the Wake of the Cold War
The end of the Cold War by all accounts should have led to a substantial reduction of warfare in Africa. Since the
ability of African states to make war was greatly amplified and extended by the support provided by competitors in the
Cold War rivalry, the end of that conflict should have vastly reduced Africa's capacity for making war.[25] However,
quite the opposite has occurred. For the first time in Africa's history, eight independent nations engaged in a panAfrican conflict, the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.[26] Indeed, this war continued in the wake of
ongoing internal conflicts in several of the belligerent nations. Elsewhere in Africa, instability and fighting continues
in Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and between Ethiopia and Eritrea.[27] Rather than
reducing warfare in Africa, the end of the international bipolar geostrategic competition has witnessed the overall
weakening of African states and the intensification of interstate and intrastate conflicts.
These African conflicts are further exacerbated by an unchecked flow of illicit arms into Africa from a variety of
sources: arms dealers, security firms, and governments pursuing their individual agendas.[28] Arms bought by
governments and other groups involved in these conflicts circulate throughout sub-regions. More than 25 percent of all
the countries on the globe are involved in one way or another with arms entering Africa.[29] On 19 November 1998,
the UN Security Council passed a resolution expressing its "grave concern at the destabilizing effect of illicit arms
flows, in particular of small arms, to Africa."[30] The extent of the problem is widespread, and action to counter it has
been limited and late. Additionally, at least two African countries, South Africa and Nigeria, now produce their own
weapons, while several African nations produce their own small-arms ammunition.[31]
Africa's conflicts have led to humanitarian tragedies of traumatized and displaced populations--with floods of refugees.
The epidemic diseases and predatory criminality that often emerges in such environments transcend the capacity of
humanitarian relief agencies to alleviate them. Thus, humanitarian problems caused by ongoing military conflict cannot
be solved by humanitarian relief agencies and must eventually be solved by diplomatic, military, or political action.
For Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, this has typically meant foreign military intervention.
Potential requirements for US military involvement in Africa increased with France's announcement in 1997 that it
would reduce its military forces on the continent by 40 percent, thereby prompting much of Francophone Africa to
look increasingly to the United States as a patron for security issues. However, no US forces (other than defense
attachés, security assistance officers, and Marine embassy guards) are presently permanently stationed in Africa.[32]
Despite--or perhaps because of--the conflicts on the continent, African countries themselves are demonstrating
unprecedented interest in regional solutions. African nations are experimenting with security arrangements and subregional approaches to conflict management. They are now more open to cooperation with the United States on
security issues than at any time in the past. This affords a substantial opportunity for the United States to shape the
regional security environment. But this opportunity may not last very long.[33]
Although African political dynamics are currently in flux, US policymakers and military planners have surprisingly
little access to much of what goes on behind the scenes among African leaders. US embassies in the region are
typically small. Not all countries have a resident US diplomatic presence. Less than half have a resident US military
representative. The United States does not have permanent representation in such regional forums as the Organization
of African Unity, the Economic Community of West African States, or the Southern African Development
Community.[34]
This US failure to engage Africa closely has led to a policy that more often than not is reactive rather than proactive. It
limits the ability to engage African decisionmakers on security issues, undermines the ability to obtain warnings of
impending political crises, and retards the ability to shape the regional security environment. A unified command with
exclusive responsibility for this region would assist in developing needed access and in bringing significantly greater
focus to US regional security policy.
With volatile situations developing in Africa on short notice, in remote areas with poorly developed or deteriorated

infrastructure, US military planners recognize that African problems require a different kind of military response than
those on the European or Asian continents. If the United States is to effectively pursue its own security interests in
Africa, respond to the needs of its African partners, and mitigate extreme human tragedies, the United States must be
able to anticipate crises earlier, respond more rapidly in their initial stages, and cooperate more efficiently with
regional actors.[35] But no matter how pressing the potential scenarios, the United States is not now prepared to act in
a timely manner in this "limited engagement" theater.
A Growing Focus on Africa
While official DOD documents clearly state that the United States has few strategic interests in Sub-Saharan
Africa[36] (notwithstanding our oil and mineral imports), humanitarian interests and concerns for the safety of US
citizens have prompted US military interventions in the region more than 20 times since the beginning of the 1990s, as
noted earlier. In fact, no region of the world has seen a greater number of foreign or US military interventions in the
past decade than Sub-Saharan Africa. The region also has received widespread humanitarian assistance from major
international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
The role of the American and worldwide humanitarian community is very important in Sub-Saharan Africa. These
organizations address many of the root causes of regional violence and promote the economic development which
alone holds the promise for attenuating much of the regional instability. The US government has recognized the
importance of the humanitarian community in contingency operations and has directed the cooperation of the US
military establishment with those organizations.[37] Thus, unified commands are building "habits of cooperation"
which can be quickly activated during contingency operations. The unified commands take this role seriously and have
endeavored to comply with the spirit and letter of the directive. However, because the responsibility for continental
Africa is split between two separate commands, because the responsibility for the offshore islands is delegated to a
third, and because of the limited attention which any of the commands can currently afford to pay to Africa, the
potential benefits of military cooperation with the humanitarian community in Africa are severely limited.[38]
Many of Africa's continuing problems have direct security implications. Consider the following destabilizing
circumstances:
Instability promoted by ethnic tension, weak economies, narcotics smuggling, unequal distribution of income,
poor infrastructures, dysfunctional governments, and other factors that undermine the coherence of nation-states.
Limited, inadequate, and unprofessional law enforcement establishments; police that abuse rather than protect
the civil populace.
Ongoing politico-military conflicts resulting in humanitarian crises.
Unprofessional, overstrength, and underpaid militaries with the tendency for promoting coups d'etat, engaging in
human rights abuses, and contributing to political instability.
The influence of states such as Libya and Iran, which have contributed to rigged elections and other actions
deemed unacceptable by the international community.
The potential collapse of the governments of the "maxi-states" like the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Angola, Nigeria, and the Sudan, which could set off more civil or sub-regional wars, halt the flow of oil and
other strategic materials, create waves of refugees, and threaten the safety of American citizens in a variety of
ways.
Environmental degradation which reduces economic options, degrades health, and may even affect global
weather patterns.[39]
As regional instability and humanitarian crises in the region continue to challenge America's interests and values, the
United States is likely to commit resources and possibly substantial military forces in Africa in the future.
Unfortunately, this likelihood is not anticipated structurally in the present Unified Command Plan.[40] Failure to
establish a unified command or sub-unified command with exclusive responsibility for Sub-Saharan Africa
significantly limits the continuous attention that the US security community can pay to the region, could seriously
compromise US regional interests, and will make the inevitable military interventions more costly and less effective.
National Security Strategy for Africa

While past US foreign policy toward Sub-Saharan African has been generally reactive, unsteady, and late, thus
allowing events and crises to drive policy,[41] the Clinton Administration demonstrated a renewed interest in this
region. An April 1998 visit by the President to six nations of Sub-Saharan Africa underscored his personal awareness
of the sub-region and seemed to presage an increased US commitment to the development of Sub-Saharan Africa. A
second Clinton visit to the region in August 2000 demonstrated continuing US engagement. While tangible results of
the Clinton visits are yet to come, Africans generally have reacted very positively to this expression of US attention.
The Clinton Administration articulated three broad policies for Africa that require substantial and direct involvement:
enhancing security to promote peace and stability, promoting prosperity by integrating Africa into the world economy,
and fostering democracy and respect for human rights.[42] These three core policies in turn support a variety of more
specific goals.[43]
Policymakers are well aware of the fact that they cannot subcontract the responsibility for securing America's interests
in Africa to any existing alliance or ally. As the "one indispensable country"[44] in the post-Cold War world, the
United States will inexorably take the lead in ensuring that its priorities are secured. But with competing commitments
around the world, the United States has only limited resources to commit to Africa. The Cold War policy of
generously distributing resources to any pro-Western or anti-Soviet state around the world no longer applies.[45]
Current US strategy and policy for Africa do not adequately reflect the changed geopolitical landscape, nor do they
realistically establish the magnitude of US security interests in that region. The challenge of balancing resources
against US interests to realize the best use of limited assets is a key role of a unified command.[46] Under the current
circumstances, this task is not being accomplished well in Africa.[47]
As a truly regional representative of the United States, a unified combatant commander also functions as a singular
subject-matter expert for his or her area of responsibility, particularly in regard to security issues. The division of
responsibility for Africa among various unified commands makes it difficult for the United States to prioritize its
regional security interests and pursue them consistently.[48] The differing organizational cultures and geographical
focuses of the unified commands, along with the differing personalities of their leaders, lend an unfortunate
subjectivity to US security relationships in Africa. Despite the best efforts of US military staff officers to be
accommodating, African civil and military leaders have expressed puzzlement over the Unified Command Plan's lesser
emphasis on Africa.[49]
With all but eight of 53 African countries in its area of responsibility, the US European Command (USEUCOM) is
responsible for the vast majority of the African continent (see Figure 1, below).[50] However, more immediate threats
to US national interests have garnered the lion's share of USEUCOM's attention. Ongoing military operations in Bosnia
and Yugoslavia, the recent expansion of NATO, inclusion of European former states of the Soviet Union into its area
of responsibility, the Arab-Israeli peace process, and continuing involvement in Northern Iraq have required the
command to focus on the European and Middle Eastern geographic regions. Africa is thus by necessity relegated to the
position of a "limited engagement" theater.[51]

Figure 1. Current commanders' areas of responsibility for Africa.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has responsibility for the remainder of the countries on the African mainland,
specifically those nations bordering on the Red Sea. But this is only a small part of CENTCOM's area of
responsibility, stretching 3,100 miles east to west and 3,600 miles north to south. Included in this region are 25 nations
spread from Northeast Africa across Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia (including the Arabian Gulf
countries), an area including 70 percent of the proven oil reserves in the world and 428 million people.[52] In view of
the ongoing efforts to incorporate the Central Asian countries that were former states of the Soviet Union into the
CENTCOM area of responsibility, it is no wonder that Africa is secondary to CENTCOM's main attractions.[53]
Further, the existing unified commands are not particularly aligned with African cultural realities. For instance, US
humanitarian intervention in Rwanda in 1994 (a USEUCOM responsibility) required extensive use of Kenyan ports
and airfields, but Kenya falls within CENTCOM's area of responsibility.[54] The existing unified command structure
was not designed to facilitate such interventions.
The same structural dilemma has occurred more recently with the reemergence of the East African Community,
consisting of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. This sub-regional entity is developing a mutual security infrastructure,
making it a logical partner for a US unified command.[55] Unfortunately, Kenya is within the CENTCOM area, while
Tanzania and Uganda are within the USEUCOM area.
More important, America's relative lack of pressing regional interests means that the attention of its senior
policymakers to African issues will be sporadic and episodic. This makes it even more important to maintain close,
consistent relations with emerging sub-regional organizations and with regional actors--a key unified command role.

To be effective, the unified command responsible for this region should have a nuanced appreciation for the interests
and perspectives of regional actors and should be in constant communication with regional partners.[56] It also should
have an organizational culture compatible with the region. This is true of USEUCOM in its NATO relationships, of
CENTCOM in its Arabian Gulf connections, and of PACOM in the Far East. Yet this cultural sensitivity is obviously
lacking with regard to Africa.
Looking to the Future
To date, US foreign policy for Africa, and specifically Sub-Saharan Africa, has been reactive rather than proactive-generally driven by events rather than shaping events.[57] Because of this tentative approach to the region, African
problems have obliged the US military to undertake a continuing series of contingency operations, and the prospect for
future interventions is high. If any region of the world warrants the kind of "shaping" now prescribed by US strategic
doctrine,[58] surely that region is Africa.
While US security interests in Africa are minimal and economic interests are currently limited (excepting the
importation of oil and strategic minerals), the developed world does not ignore humanitarian tragedy. With its
prominent position in the post-Cold War world, the United States will at times accede to international pressures to take
the lead in addressing the problems of Sub-Saharan Africa. For the immediate future, such initiatives will require the
capacity to intervene militarily when appropriate. US reluctance to accept this responsibility would undermine
important international relationships and ultimately could require a far greater commitment and involvement of
resources when events finally force the US hand.
It is in the best interests of the United States to stay actively involved in the region to ensure that strategic objectives
are accomplished and that diplomatic and political goals are achieved. The Department of Defense already plays some
role in US efforts in Africa to promote democratization, to increase respect for human rights, to promote conflict
resolution, and to generate economic prosperity.[59] Those efforts could be more effectively managed by structural
change within the Unified Command Plan.
If any region of the world warrants careful US attention to potential coalitions to alleviate greater reliance on US
resources, surely that region is Africa. This is a key unified command role[60] which can best be accomplished by
creating a unified or sub-unified command exclusively for Sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure 2, below). The advantages
of creating "an area-oriented senior US military command,"[61] even if it is only an "economy of force" command
headquartered in the United States, would far outweigh any perceived disadvantages.

Figure 2. Proposed US Africa Command (USAFCOM) and revised commanders' areas of
responsibility.

In the end we must ask whether US policy goals and priorities for Sub-Saharan Africa are aligned with our current
structural ability to secure them, whether they are realistically based on present funding levels, and whether they are
adequate for anticipating and alleviating crises. "Shaping" the environment to avoid crises is a far less expensive option
than responding to full-blown emergencies with expensive and uncertain military interventions. Events since the early
1990s suggest that US policy "ends" in Africa are not aligned with our "ways and means." Recent African history
suggests that the inevitable result of failure to anticipate a crisis is horrifying human tragedy and a requirement to
resort to expensive military operations. At the same time, Africa has entered a period of significant social and political
flux and is now more open to US assistance on security issues than at any time in the past. If there ever was a time for
the United States to shape the African regional security environment, this is it.
US policy alone cannot solve Africa's many problems, nor even necessarily secure all of America's regional interests
there, but a unified command with exclusive responsibility for Sub-Saharan Africa would provide many advantages. It
would bring the constant attention of senior US military planners to African security issues and facilitate long-term,
coherent programs to shape the regional environment. This attention would be much less subject to distraction because
of events in the Balkans or the Arabian Gulf. Such a command would be in constant communication with African civil
and military leaders, as well as with US diplomats in the region. This interactive focus would provide better warning
of impending crises, a much more nuanced understanding of African interests, and more options for crisis management
than is presently the case. It would also better communicate US concerns to African partners and potential adversaries.
It would certainly signal an important US commitment to regional stability and regional development.

The unified combatant commander plays a key role in American efforts to realize regional strategic objectives as
outlined in the National Security Strategy. This includes conflict avoidance as well as conflict management. But with
responsibility for Sub-Saharan Africa divided among three of the five regional combatant commands, and with none of
them focused consistently on African issues, US regional interests in Africa are poorly served. As both his right within
the law and his responsibility as the Commander-in-Chief, the new US President should establish a unified or
subordinate unified combatant command with exclusive responsibility for Sub-Saharan Africa.
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